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TRIAL AND ERROR: THE DETROIT SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASE.

By Eleanor P. Wolf. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 1981.
Pp. 373. $19.95.
Although school desegregation cases following Brown v. Board of
Education 1 originally required only racially neutral pupil assignment, more recent cases demand the elimination of "all vestiges of
state imposed segregation."2 In Trial and Error, Professor Eleanor
Wolf attacks the assumptions that underlie these stricter remedial
requirements. Wolf thoroughly examines the Detroit school desegregation case3 and concludes that the evidence presented was misleading, incomplete, and prejudicial to the Detroit School Board.
Had the evidence accurately reflected the available social science research, she asserts, the Detroit school system would not have been
found guilty of unconstitutional behavior.
Wolf takes the "scientific" testimony of the expert witnesses in
the Detroit case as her starting point. Juxtaposing their testimony
with her own analysis of the social science research, she methodically (1) demonstrates that Judge Roth received the misleading impression that residential segregation4 resulted from state-imposed
housing discrimination; (2) undermines the seductive proposition
that integration of the schools would eliminate impediments to black
children's achievement without harming white children and would
generally improve race relations; and (3) shows that it is impossible
to prove that the Detroit School Board's actions caused or contributed to persistent segregation in the City's schools.5
l. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. l, 15 (1971).
3. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971). Judge Stephen Roth's finding
of segregative constitutional violations by the Detroit School Board led to his ill-fated busing
order involving 53 suburban school districts. The Supreme Court limited the remedy to Detroit since the suburban school districts had not been found guilty of constitutional violations.
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 753 (1974).
4. Judge Roth relied, in part, on a finding of state-imposed residential segregation in issuing his widespread busing order. 338 F. Supp. at 587. The Sixth Circuit approved the busing
remedy, but expressly rejected residential segregation as a basis for its affirmance. Bradley v.
Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 242 (6th Cir. 1973).
5. The term "segregation" is used here to mean racial concentration, whether caused naturally or by governmental action.
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Wolfs solid sociological treatment of these issues contrasts
sharply with her speculative conclusions. Apparently relying on
Judge Roth's strong interest in the testimony (p. 126), she claims that
the "proofs of the harm of segregation and the benefits of integration
were crucial in motivating the judge to 'find' that Detroit School
Board actions caused racially segregated schools, despite the murky
and illogical nature of the evidence" (p. 245). Although Wolf concedes that she "cannot prove the point," she compounds her error by
suggesting that such evidence has also dictated the result "in some
other cases" (p. 245).
Although Wolfs hypothesis is intuitively attractive, there are
strong indications that her conclusion may be wrong. She reports, for
example, that Roth rejected evidence tending to refute the benefits of
integration on the ground that Brown had already decided that issue
(p. 226). His opinion, consistent with these rulings, did not mention
the supposed educational benefits of integration. Roth, moreover,
evidently was aware of the law. He expressed disappointment that
blame had to be fixed (p. 20), but proceeded to do so. There is no
documentary support for Wolfs assertion that the judge's "inclusion
of school violations was a reluctant concession to the requirements of
legal precedent" (p. 160).
Wolfs eagerness to explain Judge Roth's ruling in terms of his
reaction to the questionable social science evidence may stem from
her disbelief that the Detroit School Board, lauded for its integration
efforts, had caused school segregation. Her characterization of the
requirement that segregation be caused by school authorities as a
"legal fiction" is apt, 6 but does not complete her argument. Although it does not appear that the actions cited by the court as constitutional violations contributed substantially to school segregation,
it also does not appear that Roth ignored the requirement of a causal
connection between the School Board's actions and segregation.
Roth's ruling, like other Northern cases that have followed it,7 may
be viewed as the logical consequence of prior Southern cases. Roth
may have been influenced by evidence that integration was beneficial, but it is equally plausible that he correctly understood the
6. Wolf is not alone in observing that the causation requirement is illusory. See generally
Dayton School Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 442 U.S. 526 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Columbus School Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver Colorado, 413 U.S.
189 (1973)(Powell, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
7. The early Southern cases implied causation between past de Jure discrimination and
later school segregation even though de Jure segregation had been replaced by racially neutral
assignment schemes. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15
(1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). More recently, .Dayton and
Columbus validated district-wide busing remedies for violations similar to those cited by Roth
as having segregative effects in the Detroit schools.
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Brown mandate as requiring only a limited causal connection between school board actions and segregation.
Wolfs frustration with the attenuated causal nexus between past
discrimination and present school segregation thus seems more a
quarrel with substantive law than with the social science research
presented in Milliken. Because plaintiffs may rely on the Keyes presumption to infer district-wide segregative intent from proof of segregative intent in a meaningful portion of the school district, and on
the Green/Swann presumption that past discriminatory acts have
caused current segregation, it is difficult for school authorities to rebut a prima facie case of unconstitutional segregation. Although
Wolf ably refutes the logical conclusion drawn from these presumptions, they provide an alternative, legitimate basis for Roth's ruling.
Because the law provided a basis for Roth's decision, Wolfs conclusion that trial courts are unable to receive and evaluate misleading social science evidence is not persuasive. But she does
successfully attack many of the assumptions underlying busing, and
the book is thus a partial success. Trial and Error offers ample proof
that our current solution to a critical social problem is grossly inadequate. It may be, as Wolf observes, that social policy that attains
constitutional stature "does not readily reflect new knowledge and
more accurate appraisals of its consequences; it is the essence of such
rights that they must not depend on such cost-benefit calculations"
(p. 296). Whether or not busing is wholly unbeneficial, the right to
be bused has become constitutionally enshrined in certain circumstances. Unfortunately, Wolfs assertion that reliable presentation of
social science research results might allow judges to formulate more
effective policies is unsubstantiated.

